












Abstract   
 
This paper holds that the criteria of rational behavior, so far assumed in behavioral models, are not 
sufficiently realistic. The point of view here presented lies upon contemporary neurobiology that 
teaches how individual behavior responds to more complex and efficient criteria than the ones so 
far utilized in the decision making models. Following Simon's and Hayek's intuitions, the paper 
takes the view that knowledge is the fruit of a  process of "endogenous construction" and that  
perception represents the source of the unpredictability of behavior, and the cornerstone of 
economic change.  A relevant part of contemporary neurobiology has later confirmed these 
intuitions, and it can probably help us understand the role of emotions in the processes of choice. 
The development of this approach may have an influence on economic theory, especially with 
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Contemporary economic theory uses various decision making models in order to explain how 
agents act.  Optimizing behavior is the cornerstone of standard economics, yet its main limitation 
lies in the lack of empirical evidence of its psychological axioms (self-interest, perfect knowledge, 
substantive rationality, etc.).  This criticism has spurred economists to consider other hypotheses in 
order to explain the economic behavior of actors in a way that is more coherent with behavioral 
psychology. 
  On one side, this effort has resulted in the formulation of the expected utility theory, as an 
improvement of the method of  maximization under constraints.  On the other, a minority of authors 
has attempted a strong integration between economics and modern cognitive psychology through 
the elaboration of a decision-making theory, with outcomes o f satisficing instead of optimizing 
kind.  While in the expected utility theory we still operate within the orthodox framework of 
analysis, in the cognitive approach individual behavior is analyzed in contexts that are characterized 
by uncertainty (à la Knight) and imperfect information. 
  Having introduced two general criteria of behavior (optimizing and satisficing) used in economic 
theory, let me now point out their characteristics and see in what respect they differ. 
  First of all, there is a common e lement.  Both criteria refer to a rational behavior of the agents, 
even though the different models define  different types of rationality: substantive, strategic, 
bounded, and procedural.  The general idea is fairly clear: when we try to pursue an objective (be it 
aimed at local or global optimizing or, more simply, at satisficing),  an "intentionally rational" 
behavior is one enacted through procedures and acts which are appropriate and coherent. 
  Let us imagine an individual who needs to make a decision.   He could examine all the possible 
alternatives and choose the most profitable one.  However, as already pointed out by many authors, 
we know that this possibility is in conflict with the cognitive and computational limitations of the 
human mind.  Thus, our individual can act more realistically by valuing the costs and benefits of the 
alternatives he knows.  In this case, the outcome will coincide with the maximization of the 
expected utility. 
  Moreover, in the case that the individual  operates in a context in which, in order to decide, he 
must take other individuals into consideration, the economic theory has worked out other tools for 
an explanation.  Following a criterion very similar to the preceding one, the individual will decide   3
after having worked out a strategy that takes into consideration the most probable behavior of his 
interlocutor.   Briefly stated, this is the approach used in the theory of games.  However, this 
criterion of behavior is also open to criticism, since it requires heroic  assumptions about the 
possibility for the decision-maker to know the distribution of the probabilities of the events 
produced by the possible reaction of the other agents (Simon 1979). 
An alternative approach is the cognitivist one, that was introduced in economics by H. Simon. This 
approach criticised  neoclassical paradigms starting from the intrinsic limits of human rationality, 
introducing . an alternative method of rationality, defined “procedural”. This model emphasizes the 
process through which alternatives are generated, and the individual and collective learning 
mechanisms, with relevant consequences on the comprehension of the role of organizations. His 
model explains the processes through which alternatives are formulated, compared and assessed,  in 
conditions of uncertainty (Simon 1987a), i.e. consistently with cognitive psychology.  
  At the basis of a great part of the heterodox economic theory there is a further behavioral model, 
based on the assumption  - typical of the models of procedural rationality  - that agents have a 
bounded rationality.  Simon, in particular, has e videnced that, in the decision-making process, 
individuals "build up" the different alternatives, copying or elaborating their own routines of 
behavior.  This approach focuses  the attention on the ability of individuals to build up an adequate 
representation of the problem and to modify it according to heuristic criteria and rules of thumb.  
Simon is more worried about how the individual decides.  As Dewey (1933) had done before him, 
he points out the processes  enacted throughout decision making in order to satisfy the initial levels 
of expectations (Simon 1955). 
  As is commonly known, the criterion of procedural rationality elaborated by Simon is quite 
different from the traditional neoclassic one.  However, also in the models of procedural rationality 
we deal with individuals who, characterized as they are by the limitations and potential typical of 
cognitive reason, base their reasoning on personal experience and on the information and the 
knowledge they possess.  In all of these cases, economic actors are described as decision makers 
whose reasoning is more or less consistent with the principles of cognitive psychology.  Yet, they 
are also described as having reasoning abilities that are more typical of scientists rather than the 
normal economic agents.  When the latter make a decision, they rarely do so as the result of  "cold" 
and "deliberate" processes like the ones described by the economic theory.  Still, the models of 
economic behavior continue to describe their decision-making processes as based on the peculiar 
conception that reason is cold and calculating, perhaps bounded, but in a way "pure." 
 Moreover, standard economics assumes that economic agents are homogeneous, and such 
assumption often (as in the case of rational expectations) helps to attain formal aspects in the   4
models. Nevertheless, this specific aspect  of standard economics  - one of whose foundations is 
maximizing behavior  - has not been duly studied, not  even by heterodox economists. Only recently 
the game theory has began developing learning models with heterogeneous agents.
3 
By assuming that economic agents are homogeneous, one contradicts the observation that variety 
and diversity are two of the most relevant traits of human nature. More specifically, variety often 
arises from diversity, and - as stated by many representatives of  the Austrian school and by Hayek 
in particular  - variety is the source of change and innovation in human life. Stan Metcalfe  (1994) 
and J. Foster (1998) studied the processes through which variety is produced, and the role it plays 
within competition. However, their contributions are restricted to the fields of industrial economics 
and of competitive and evolutionary processes. 
This paper’s aim consists in extending this kind of analysis to the demand side, and in verifying 
whether it is applicable to decision-making models.  
After a brief review of the fundamental decision-making models in economics, we will deal with 
the connection between the human processes of learning and perception, and we will try to 
determine the source of variety, diversity and innovation. We will expound the complex decision-
making process, and we will see the role practical reason (which differs from pure reason) plays 
within it. 
 All rational models of behavior used by the economic theory (included the model of procedural 
rationality) are based on the concept of pure rationality, while common behavior belongs to the 
realm of practical reason. 
  Let us consider first the "original error" of these analytical limitations.  Probably, it lies in the 
explicit or implicit acceptance in decision making  models of the dichotomy mind/brain, in which 
the efficient functioning of the first is basically autonomous from the second.  It is usually believed 
that there is between the two a relationship which can effectively be described with a metaphor: the 
mind is the software, and the brain is the hardware.   
  However, the most recent studies in neurobiology have questioned this belief (Patterson  - Nawa 
1993, Berns  - Sejnowski 1995, Damasio 1995).  The starting point is simple: if rational behavior 
reflects the criteria so far assumed in behavioral models,  it is not sufficiently realistic.  In the best 
case (satisficing approach), the required time is still long and the decision-making process still 
sufficiently complex.  In the worst (maximizing approach), one gets lost in an intricate and 
realistically unsolvable maze of calculations. 
                                                                 
3 Recent contributions in game theory try to incorporate psychological elements and learning the models (Camerer 
1997, Erev and Roth 1998). See also   Fundenberg and Levine (1998) and Erev and Rapoport (1998) about learning in 
game theory.   5
  Contemporary neurobiology criticizes both the idea of the mind as a software, and the idea of 
"cold rationality" because these states of the mind manifest themselves only in pathological 
situations.  Yet, people are able to make fast decisions which can be quite complex and often are 
correct and profitable.  The reason lies in the fact that individual behavior responds to more 
complex and efficient criteria than the ones so far utilized in the decision making models.  In this 
approach uncertainty and learning are crucial. When uncertainty is the  predominant condition H. 
Simon’s procedural rationality is a major instrument to study and understand this world.  
Learning plays a key role with reference to procedural rationality. By means of learning, agent’s 
knowledge as well as the whole array of choices at his disposal are enriched with innovations. 
Learning may be defined as the  human ability of modifying one’s behaviour on the basis of 
experience, in a more or less permanent way and beyond instinctive reactions. This implies that 
organisms have a “plastic base” allowing them to respond to environmental variations.  
  The picture emerging from Simon's models is that of individuals and organizations which act 
rationally in order to reach satisficing goals.  Even though it does not give room  to the traditional 
cost-benefit analyses or to a rationality of strategic type, this approach shares with the other models 
the idea that rational behavior means to evaluate alternatives;  and that this evaluation takes place in 
an exclusive way through mental operations. But in this way, the dichotomy between reason and 
emotions is proposed, with the exclusion of the latter from the decisional processes.  
  In short, the formulation of behavioral theories in which individuals are characterized by 
procedural  rationality have given proof of great validity in its applications and has met with an 
enormous empirical correspondence.  However, these theories seem unable to give a full 
explanation of individual behavior, and should therefore be integrated with further elements which 
are normally excluded from this approach. If the idea of bounded rationality has put in a critical 
position the neoclassical hypothesis of substantive rationality, giving birth to new models of 
behavior based on procedural rationality, the introduction of neurobiological arguments and the 
integration  with cognitive analysis, attempts to enrich these models. 
In our attempt to reach this aim, we have drawn on Hayek’s pioneer work (1952), which explains 
how knowledge, novelty and uncertainty  are generated; and on recent neurobiological studies 
concerning the influence of emotional processes in decision making (Damasio 1995; Johnson-Laird 
and Oatley 1992). These works contain important implications also for economic theory, and in 
particular for the aspects we will mention below: path dependent models, prospect theory, 
asymmetrical information, and, above all, the game theory. 
 
2.0 A glance to the past   6
2.1 Expected utility and prospect theory 
 
In 1944 von Neumann and Morgenstern formulated a normative theory of decision, according to 
which an action is rational if it maximizes the utility which derives from the outcome of a choice 
(Von Neumann  - Morgenstern 1944).  One of the goals of these two scholars was to formulate in 
new and more realistic terms the heroic assumptions of the standard theory of Walrasean 
conception.  The outcome was undoubtedly a success.  In fact, the models of expected utility 
(Savage 1954) have given noteworthy advantages to the economic analysis of individual choice, 
thanks also to the inner characteristics of these models: the axiomatic basis, the independence from 
the decision maker's constraints, the formal elegance. 
  Nevertheless, this theory has been the object of a great deal of criticism.  Some of it concerns the 
actual ability of individuals to solve complex problems.  In the light of the results of cognitive 
psychology on the computational limitations of the human mind, it cannot be maintained that 
individuals are able to imagine all the possible outcomes of t he various alternatives of action and 
consequently choose the alternative that maximizes the expected utility (Simon 1979).  
Furthermore, the criticism has directly invested also the axiomatic assumptions of the theory, 
particularly the principles of transitivity, dominance, and procedure invariance (Allais 1953; Luce-
Raiffa 1957, Tversky 1969; Arrow 1972; Schoemaker 1982; Machina 1982; Fishburn 1983; Luce - 
Narens 1985; Kreps 1988).  
  More recently, Kahneman and Tversky have unified the two criticisms of  the theory of expected 
utility: first, the criticism of the idea that the psychological principles concerning the computational 
abilities are inconsistent;  and, second, the criticism of the systematic violation of the principle of 
procedure invariance.   Through a series of experiments, the two authors e laborated a new model 
which describes economic behavior, the Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  This 
theory represents an alternative to the theory of the expected utility and has given a strong impulse 
to experimental economics, a rather successful branch of economics which has developed 
particularly in recent years.  In extreme synthesis, Kahneman and Tversky hold that human 
reasoning is studded with weak points and, therefore with continuous failures of rationality, as it is 
conceived in the maximizing approach.  This situation is due to the limits of the calculating skills of 
our mind, but also and above all to the fact that  biological impulses, which often manifest 
themselves as emotions, are active in the processes of choice.  One of the most famous outcomes of 
the experiments of Kahneman and Tversky is the demonstration of the invalidity of the principle of 
procedure invariance.  According to this principle, if a result is preferred to another, such order of 
preference cannot be modified or upset by the way in which options are confronted.  In other words,   7
the decision maker should be free from the type of representation of the decisional problem.  Yet, 
empirical reality shows a constant violation of the principle of procedure invariance, because people 
tend to treat profits differently than losses.  The chosen options vary according to whether the 
emphasis is put on profits or on losses, even though the final results remain the same. 
  The Prospect Theory has the merit of emphasizing the way in which the outcomes are codified 
and in which this codification is responsible for the different individual attitudes towards risk. 
  The fundamental passage from the theory of expected utility to  the Prospect Theory consists of 
the definitive abandonment of the unrealistic assumptions of the subjective abilities to value the 
outcomes of every known alternative
4.  However, the most important lesson taught by the work of 
Kahneman and Tversky is that  the failures of rationality are not only due to the computing limits of 
the human mind, but also to the influences of the biological impulses.  As we shall see, the latter 
aspect holds a noteworthy analytical relevance. 
 
2.2.  The theory of games 
 
The application of the theory of games in economics has developed within the decision making 
theory, in a probabilistic context and in strict connection with the theory of expected utility.  Also in 
this case rationality is exerted through the calculation of costs and benefits, and by keeping in mind 
the probable behavior of the opponent.  The main innovation introduced in the theory of games 
seems to be that of strategic behavior.  As is known, if there is a dominant strategy calculated with 
the minimax criterion, it is this strategy that will determine individual behavior.  If there is no 
dominant strategy, every individual defines his own strategy according to the behavior he expects 
from his opponent.  As is well known, the most probable result of non-cooperative games is an 
Nash equilibrium.  However, Axelrod (1984) has held that, in the case of repeated games, it is 
possible to reach a Pareto equilibrium, thanks to the learning processes of the individuals involved 
in the game. 
  What are the criteria that lie at the basis of the strategic behavior assumed by the theory of 
games?  The problematic subjects that can be discussed are many, and I believe that Rapoport 
(1962) has already pointed them out many years ago.  In my opinion, the weakest point in the 
theory lies in the assumption that every individual should possess a payoff function, which 
presupposes a scale of values that can be given to the events.  This assumption is once again 
                                                                 
4 Before Kahneman and Tversky, others authors  have criticized standard economics for the scarce consideration of psy-
chological aspects: Tarde (1902);  Scitovsky (1976);  Katona (1975); Strumpel (1972); Newcomb (1972), Simon 
(1956). 
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inconsistent with the realistic idea of the limited cognitive skills of  the human mind.  Furthermore, 
in most models which use the theory of games, the qualifying element lies in the fact that 
individuals act only on the basis of a personal, calculated interest.  In the case of the repeated 
games, however, the expectations  of someone's behavior result from individual learning processes, 
which bring out categories such as trust, non-belligerence, etc.  As Rapoport (1962) has asserted, 
within the context of these categories people act according to their wisdom, not their knowledge. 
  Summing up, the rational behavior assumed in the theory of games meets the same criticism that 
has been directed to the theory of expected utility, with the important addition that in the repeated 
game learning matters in such a relevant way, that it leads to Pareto-efficient results.   
The most recent literature on the game theory has introduced the analysis of learning processes with 
heterogenous agents in repeated games, thus developing models that are more consistent with the 
assumptions of cognitive psychology (Erev and Roth 1998). The outcome is a return to Nash’ s 
multiple equilibria also in repeated games (see, for instance, Kalai and Lehrer 1993; Ellison 1993; 
Sonsino 1997, Mailath 1998). As mentioned below, Pareto-efficient solutions in repeated games are 
hardly compatible with the hypothesis of differentiated learning, arising from neurobiological 
discoveries; on the contrary, the attainment of Nash’s equilibria in repeated games is fully coherent 
with it and with Hayek’s intuitions. 
I shall return on this point in the following pages. 
 
2.3. Simon and procedural rationality 
 
H. Simon has conceived one of the most convincing models of rational behavior.  His initial idea 
identifies human cognitive skills with the ability of individuals to make symbolic representations of 
reality, through which they form their own convictions and shape and evaluate possible alternatives.  
A decision is not a mere choice between alternatives, but the result of a process of symbolic 
elaboration.  It consists of the gathering and evaluation of the information and knowledge that are 
necessary for individuals in order to make a representation of the relevant data for the solution of 
the problem.  The quality of being limited, typical of rationality, is evidenced by  the fact that the 
manipulation of symbols is a process subject to the bonds of time, to costs, and to the use of energy.  
In fact, it is a slow and laborious process, in which only some of the possible alternatives are 
explored (the ones the individual is able to represent to himself) (Simon 1967). 
  The solutions thus reached have the form of  procedures, that is, of series of steps that must be 
taken in order to reach the desired results.  If these procedures prove themselves to be efficient, they 
are turned into routines.  The effectiveness of the procedures is measured simply by their ability to   9
satisfy the individual's levels of aspiration.  This model is perfectly coherent with the psychological 
theories of behavior and choice, and is consistent w ith the cognitive and computational bounds of 
the human mind.  It lies at the basis of the idea of individual behavior, but also of organizational 
behavior (Simon 1979; Nelson - Winter 1982). 
  Two aspects of this theoretic-methodological approach seem to b e particularly relevant.  The 
first one concerns once again the centrality of the role of learning in the processes of imitation as 
well as in those that generate new routines.  The other one concerns the explicit use of the above-
mentioned metaphor of the mind as software and the brain as hardware.  According to this idea, the 
models of thought (software) can be described in a way that is completely independent with respect 
to the structure of the nervous system (Simon 1969).  (I shall return to both these aspects further 
on). 
  The picture emerging from Simon's models is that of individuals and organizations which act 
rationally in order to reach satisficing goals.  Even though it does not give room to the traditional 
cost-benefit analyses or to a rationality of strategic type, this approach shares with the other models 
the idea that rational behavior means to evaluate alternatives;  and that this evaluation takes place in 
an exclusive way through mental operations.  Once again, the dichotomy between reason and 
emotions is proposed, with the exclusion of the latter from the decisional processes.  
  In short, the formulation of behavioral theories in which individuals are characterized by 
procedural rationality have given proof of great validity in its applications and has met with an 
enormous empirical correspondence.  However, these theories seem unable to give a full 
explanation of individual behavior, and should therefore be integrated with further elements which 
are normally excluded from this approach.  I hope the remaining part of this paper will adequately 
justify this statement.  
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2.4. Hayek and the sensory order 
 
In a book little known to economists, published in 1952, F. von Hayek has dealt with neurobiology 
and psychology.  In these pages he has held the idea that knowledge is the fruit of a process of 
"endogenous construction." 
  The knowledge utilized by individuals is the outcome of mostly tacit  processes which are 
founded on genetic differences and preceding experiences.  Every person acts a fter having deve-
loped a process of "interpretation" of the external (objective) information, which he transforms into  
subjective knowledge, which is unique and original, being based on the person's genetic traits and 
on his personal experiences.  Through a learning process that takes place over the years, in turn, 
genetic traits and personal experiences continuously recreate the neurobiological condition  (Hayek 
1952). 
  Contemporary neurobiology is confirming Hayek's intuitions: "as we develop from infancy to 
adulthood, the design of brain circuitries that represent our evolving body and its interaction with 
the world seems to depend on the activities in which the organism engages, and on the action of 
innate bioregulatory circuitries" (Damasio 1995, p. 111); (Hayek 1952; Patterson  - Nawa 1993, 
Berns Sejnowsky 1995)  "The unpredictable profile of experiences of each individual does have a 
say in circuit design, both directly and indirectly, via the reaction it sets off in the innate circuitries, 
and the consequences that such reactions have in the overall process of circuit shaping" (Damasio 
1995, p.112; Hayek 1952).  However, some cerebral circuitries remain stable, and the brain builds 
up its balance between stable and unstable circuitries. 
  Hayek h as thus laid the foundations for a neurobiological understanding of subjective diversity.  
At any given point in an individual's life, a great part of his cerebral circuits is personal and unique, 
since it reflects the history and events of that particular organism (Witt 1992, Vanberg 1994, cap. 
6), who is also the result of the interactive process which takes place with his cultural and social 
context (Hayek 1952; 1963). In other words, "time cannot pass without modifying knowledge" 
(Lachmann 1977, p. 93). 
  Therefore, insisting on the creative dimension of the individuals, Hayek portrays subjective 
perception as the primary source of the dynamics of social processes, including the economic ones.  
Differentiated perceptions obviously affect also individual learning, which acquires, in turn, the 
characteristic of being heterogeneous.  And here we have singled out the cornerstone of economic 
change (Rizzello 1999a - Rizzello 1997).   11 
  Moreover, the perception process also represents the source of the unpredictability of behavior, 
given the uniqueness of the paths of personal experience.  Also in the simple case of a transaction 
with agents characterized by equal distribution of information, it will be impossible to predict the 
outcome, since it depends on t he way in which the knowledge of individuals on the data itself will 
be subjectively and thus unpredictably "constructed" (Rizzello 1999b). 
  This idea lies at the basis of the concept of endogenous change, characteristic of the evolutionary 
tradition (Witt 1992, p. 405) which however does not fully explain how change is generated (Witt 
1992, p.407).  My hope is that these first suggestions may give  at least a partial contribution to the 
identification of the way to a more satisfactory answer. 
  This paper is focused on the influence of the neurobiological structures on economic theory.  
Concluding this section, I would like to stress more effectively Hayek's central role, as the founder 
of the subjectivist approach (on subjectivism in Austrian tradition see Shackle 1979; Lachmann 
1976).  This role is not always acknowledged; if it were, his thought would be the o bject of 
interpretations of more consequence. 
  Before moving on to describe in a somewhat more systematic way the results obtained by 
contemporary neurobiology, let me underline some important points.  In my opinion, so far two 
different well-founded positions have emerged with respect to the problem of how knowledge is 
acquired.  On one side, the psychological position, ascribable especially to Simon, has particularly 
stressed the mechanical (and bounded) aspect of the treatment of complex information.  On the 
other side, the neurobiological or subjectivist approach of the Austrian school, ascribable to Hayek, 
emphasizes especially the creative aspect of the decision.  At this point, I would like to anticipate 
one of this paper's conclusions:   the two aspects are complementary and should both be considered 
in order to understand the decision making process.  Consequently, rationality is not  only bounded 
by the cognitive and computing skills, but also by unintentional and purely hazardous aspects, such 
as the ones that appear in the formation of our perceptions.  
  Let us try to broaden our understanding of this point by drawing directly from t he teachings of 
neurobiology. 
 
3.0. The neurobiological dimension 
 
Recent research has yielded an explosion of literature that establishes a strong connection between 
emotional and cognitive processes 
A. Damasio, one of the most prominent contemporary neurologists and author of  Descartes' Error 
(Damasio 1995), draws an intimate connection between emotion and cognition in practical decision   12 
making. The existence of this connection has been confirmed also by other authors (Barnes and 
Thagard 1996 and  Barnes and T hagard 1997). Damasio has reached extremely interesting results 
starting from the distinction between pure and practical reason.  The decisions to marry, to register 
in a university, or to make an investment are influenced also by the social dimension to w hich one 
belongs.  To solve a complex theorem in physics or to decide whether an appeal should be pre-
sented  to the Supreme Court involves choices that reach farther than the immediate personal 
dominion.  Practical reason is exerted in the first case and, in the second, theoretic reason or even 
pure reason. 
  Undoubtedly, if we face the analysis of the decision making processes on a positive and not 
normative level, and if we refer to the behavior of the common man and not of the scientists, the 
object of our interest will be practical reason.  Up to now, we could avail ourselves of a theory of 
choice derived from cognitive psychology and based upon criteria of procedural rationality, which 
has proved to be rather satisfactory.  However, this theory does not make any distinction between 
theoretic and practical reason, at least it does not do it so explicitly. 
  Neurology teaches us that practical reason has two qualities, which directly concern the decision 
making process, and which have not been considered by the traditional theories.  I would sum them 
up as follows:  
- 1.  The ability to predict and make plans for the future does not only depend on psychosocial 
aspects, but also on cerebral aspects, in absence of which the action does not take place. 
- 2 .  Normally, the individual ability to plan one's economic actions depends on the so-called 
"somatic markers."  These are cerebral mechanisms, which have a biological nature.  For instance, 
whenever they register a danger in any of the operations they are evaluating, they transmit it to the 
prefrontal cortex, seat of rational planning, inducing the individual to carefulness. 
  Let us consider more closely the characteristics of these two qualities. 
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3.1. The influence of neurobiological processes on decision making 
 
Up to now, authors felt that the decision making process of economic agents depended exclusively 
on psychological characteristics.  Now we are able to assert that it is necessary to integrate the 
analysis with research on the neurobiological aspects.  It has been proved, in fact, that there are 
individuals with specific neurobiological characteristics, who are unable to do rather common 
actions, such as being prudent when circumstances require it.  This phenomenon has been observed 
in individuals characterized by a particular cerebral structure (the so-called prefrontal individuals), 
who have a slight lesion in the brain, which does not allow them to be prudent and especially to 
predict the future, particularly with regard to risks connected  with economic decisions.  Let us 
consider an example. 
  Let us imagine that someone suggests us to participate to a particularly risky game, which we 
have not known before, and which has a good probability to reduce us to bankruptcy (but we do not 
know it).  It is quite probable that, after a few moves, we realize the great risk we are running and 
decide to stop.  However, if we are prefrontal individuals, we will quite probably continue to play 
until we are bankrupt.  In the first case, after a few moves, the somatic markers signal the danger, 
and the player is induced to quit the action.  In the case of the individual with a prefrontal lesion, the 
somatic markers are equally activated and signal the danger in some part of the brain.  However, 
they are u nable to transmit this signal to the area of the brain that is responsible for rational 
planning, since some kind of a switch  does not permit the transmission of the message. 
  Unlike others, these individuals are unable to learn from the game and, in general, from their 
mistakes, because at some point the interaction between brain and mind is interrupted.  A gain, this 
situation is not due to the traditional psychological mechanisms, typical of the individual who is in 
favour or against the assumption of r isks; it is due to innate neurologic causes (Damasio 1995, p. 
218). 
  A particularly interesting aspect is that there can be relevant consequences also on those persons, 
who have slight and not immediately evident inborn prefrontal lesions. 
  We shall evaluate further on the importance of these discoveries for the economic theory.  For 
now, let us consider the second quality of practical reason, synthetically described above in point 2 
(section 3.0). 
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3.2. The importance of feelings and emotions in decision making processes. 
 
In a recent paper, J. Elster (1998) has analyzed the role of emotions in the economic theory of 
decision making, taking into account also the neurobiological aspects of the problem. Quoting a 
passage from De Sousa 1987, p. 195, he pointed out that the “role of emotion is to supply the 
insufficiency of reason (...) for a variable but always limited time, an emotion limits the range of 
information that organism will take into account, the inferences actually drawn from a potential 
infinity,  and the set of live options from which it will choose” (De Sousa quoted in Elster 1998, pp. 
59 - 60). We will now examine these mechanisms in detail. 
Contemporary neurobiology is giving evidence that "feelings are a powerful influence on reason, 
that the b rain systems required by the former are enmeshed in those needed by the latter, and that 
such specific systems are interwoven with those which regulate the body" (Damasio 1955, p.245). 
  When an individual faces a problematic situation, he can become aware of unpleasant sensations 
of a physical nature, which tend to prevent him from choosing certain alternatives or, conversely, 
that induce him to choose others. 
  There is something in our body that, in a way altogether natural and unconscious, compels our 
attention to focus on the negative outcome to which a certain action can lead, thus acting as an 
automatic alarm device which warns: "beware the danger that is expecting you if you choose the 
option that leads to such result."  This signal induces to abandon that option, decreasing the number 
of the considered alternatives.  The "signallers" are the "somatic markers," which make an 
immediate screening of the alternatives we are building up (Damasio 1955, pp. 174-5). 
  Somatic markers are created by secondary emotions and have been connected through learning 
to foreseen future outcomes of some settings.  They are impulses which lead reasoning in the form 
of feelings or unconscious tendency (Damasio 1955, 245; see also Johnson- Laird  and Oatley 
1992). 
  To avoid the risk of giving the reader a wrong idea, it is nevertheless necessary to make a 
clarification.  In the decisional process we do not use only somatic markers: as already mentioned, 
they make the initial screening and are then connected with a reasoning process.  The markers 
simply make the decision making process more efficient and precise, while their absence reduces 
efficiency and precision (Damasio 1955, 174). 
  Most somatic markers, which we use to decide in a rational way, are formed within our b rain 
during the educational and socializing process through the connection of specific classes of stimuli 
with specific classes of somatic states (Damasio 1995, 177).  They are acquired through experience   15 
in a system of internal preferences, under the influence of an external system, which includes not 
only entities and events with which one interacts, but also social conventions and ethical norms 
(Damasio 1995, 179).  Prefrontal cortices represent categorizations of situations in which an 
individual has been previously involved during his life experiences (Damasio 1995, 181). 
 
3.3. Some considerations 
 
At this point, it seems that two are the relevant aspects to emphasize: (i) the subjective nature of the 
neurobiological processes, and (ii) the role of somatic markers in the decision making process. 
  All of this teaches that to explain and predict behavior is a more complicated task than what has 
so far been believed, and that it is necessary to begin to give serious consideration to the hypothesis 
that prediction may be altogether impossible.  This conclusion derives from the following 
considerations. 
  As far as the first aspect is concerned (i), we know now that everyone, facing a problematic 
situation, actuates a continuous series of events in accordance with the previously categorized 
knowledge.  Thus, it follows that individual uniqueness becomes a very important criterion for the 
definition of the processes of choice and action, especially when trying to make homogeneous 
models of action;  all  this, considering particularly  the unpredictable pattern of individual 
experiences, which Hayek had already pointed out (the same concepts can be found in Johnson  - 
Laird and Oatley 1992). 
  For what concerns the second aspect (ii), the presence of somatic markers adds one more 
element to the already satisfactory theory of procedural rationality.  This theory becomes enriched 
and completed with the idea that somatic markers act to reduce the need for sifting, an idea which 
allows to describe the decision making process in an even more realistic way. 
 
4.0 Some consequences for economics 
 
 With the above considerations we meant to underline the important role played by the 
neurobiological processes of perception and learning in decision making. It seems to us that also the 
foundations of diversity and variety have thus been determined, and that the important role played 
by emotions is now taking shape. What are the economic implications of a new decision-making 
model that is consistent with such psychoneurobiological evidence? There is certainly still much to 
study in this field. Nevertheless, we may try to list a few implications for the theories we have dealt   16 
with and which are based on  a strong hypothesis of optimization: prospect theory, game theory, 
asymmetrical information and path-depenedence. 
 
 
4.1. Prospect theory 
 
Probably few words are sufficient to assert that what has so far emerged strengthens the hypothesis 
of Kahneman and Tversky on the invalidity of the principle of procedure invariance.  The i mportant 
influence of somatic markers in the processes of choice and, particularly, their emotional dimension 
are amply able to explain why there are failures of rationality when the way in which options are 
confronted is modified.  These failures occur not only because of the computational limits of the 
human mind, but also because of the influence of these emotional stimuli, whose nature and role in 
decision making processes is finally known. 
  These statements may easily be extended to the whole ambit of  experimental economics. In 
particular. This seems to confirm the criticism to the neoclassical hypothesis on the exogenous na-
ture of utility functions. As experimental economics is pointing out, preferences do not pre-exist the 
decision making process, but they are built up through it (Simonson  - Tversky 1993). Moreover, 
this approach seems to strengthen the relevance of externalities on the demand side: in these models 
utility of goods depends on the users' number (Huber - Payne - Puto 1982; Simonson  1989).   
 
4.2. The theory of games 
 
In section 2.2. we have already mentioned the limits of the criteria of strategic rationality assumed 
by the theory of games. However, one point has been left pending: the hypothesis that, in repeated 
games, learning leads to Pareto-efficient solutions.  Yet, recent contributions on the subject have 
demonstrated that this outcome cannot be taken for granted, if an hypothesis of differentiated 
learning is introduced. In fact, Nash’s equilibria are quite likely to occur (Kalai - Lehrer 1993). 
Traditional game theory assumes that agents are characterized by homogeneous learning criteria.  
But if we pay attention to what comes out of the recent neurobiological studies, that learning 
processes differ (neurologically) from an individual to another, it becomes harder to maintain the 
validity of the outcome of repeated games as a Pareto equilibrium.  In fact, in these games the agent 
A creates his expectations of the behavior of agent B according to his own perception and learning 
criteria, and vice versa. But if perception and learning are strongly influenced by subjective criteria, 
the uncertainty about the behavior of others increases.  The standard models start from the   17 
homogenous presupposition of agents who follow their own s elf-interest.  We know at this point 
that between the two extremes - on one hand, individuals absolutely unable to pursue their own self-
interest (prefrontal individuals), and, on the other, the pure economic man (inexistent)  - there are 
individuals with personal characteristics, which are unpredictable ex ante, being highly subjective.  
What is mostly important is that also learning processes are diversified and not homogenous.  This 
differentiation, which is based on neuronal structural differences a nd on the subjective traits of 
somatic markers, can have an enormous influence on the final results of the decision making 
process, even when it is very slight.  All this is consistent with  - and even corroborates  - the 
hypotheses of the most recent models of the theory of non-cooperative repeated games, whose 
outcomes are Nash’s equilibrium. 
  The lesson which can be learned can be extended, beyond the theory of games, to all models 
based on learning processes.  If we do without the simplifying idea, which  does not find full 
empirical evidence, of the homogeneity of the learning processes among agents, it becomes 
necessary to reconsider also all of the models based on procedural rationality. 
 
4.3. Asymmetrical information 
 
In the model of choice with asymmetrical information devised by Akerlof in 1970, the concept of 
equal distribution of quality can only be admitted in theory if, like in the Walrasian model of 
exchange, one assumes the traditional axioms of equal distribution of information and of 
substantive rationality, coherent with the principle of maximization. 
  This possibility, however, becomes inconsistent, if we consider that the differences in the 
neuronal structure and in the somatic markers induce individuals to interpret in different ways the 
same data.  Practically, information may be objective, as in the case of equal distribution among 
agents, but the knowledge used in the processes of choice is subjective, idiosyncratic, and personal.  
In this way, the element that, even though only theoretically, maintained the validity of the 
traditional transaction model becomes unfounded.  
Asymmetrical  information has an endogenous nature and results from the individual neuronal 
processes. In the case of two contracting parties, it follows that the exchange cannot occur in 
traditional terms, not even in the presence of even distribution of quality and information, because 
this conclusion would be inconsistent with the cognitive processes by which knowledge is acquired 
and utilized (Rizzello 1999b).  
 
4.4. Path-dependence   18 
 
Path-dependence has been introduced in economic theory in the last ten years.  In general terms, at 
the basis of path-dependency lies the idea that after small historical events may follow relevant 
consequences, which economic action m ay modify only in a limited way (David 1985; Arthur 
1988).  David (1985) shows how the adoption and the rapidity of the diffusion of new technologies 
may depend on the existence of externalities on the demand side.  The traditional mechanism, 
through which superior technologies take the place of pre-existing ones, may not be set off.  
As stated by Paul David (1997), path dependence indicates the dynamic properties of allocation 
processes, taking into consideration the relationship between dynamic processes and the outcome 
they tend to. A distinction can be made between path-dependent and non path-dependent processes : 
path-independent processes are the ones which converge at an equilibrium pattern in a unique, 
overall, and stable way “or, in the case of stochastic systems, those for which there exists an 
invariant (stationary) asymptotic probability distribution that is continuos over the entire feasible 
space of outcome  - i. e., a limiting distribution that is continuous over all the states that are 
compatible with the energy of the system” (ergodic processes) (David 1997, p. 13). 
We can say that non-ergodic processes - the ones which can free themselves from their own history 
- have path-dependent outcomes. This means that the state-dependent system includes two or more 
absorbent sub-aggregates (locally stable distinct regions of equilibrium). Therefore, drawing a 
general conclusion, we may say that “a path dependent stochastic process is one whose asymptotic 
distribution evolves as a consequence (function of) the process’ own history” (David, p.14) 
As further specified by North (1990, p.97-98), path dependence is a way of narrowing the concept 
of a set of choice in a period of time. It does not imply, instead, an inevitable outcome, being the 
future definitely predicted by the past. How are self-strengthening mechanisms started ? Hayek, 
who has studied the neurobiological aspect of this mechanism in depth, explained that strong 
rigidities leading to trapping states are produced, by means of learning and perception processes, on 
the basis of  stochastic elements.  
Apparently, neurobiological analyses confirm and reinforce the idea that the small, absolutely 
casual events, may show themselves to be irreversible and relevant. The forming of neuronal 
circuitries and the somatic markers, which lie behind the construction of the knowledge used in the 
decision making process, are strongly path-dependent, because they depend on the subjectivity of 
the innate circuits and on the uniqueness of the experiences that are grafted on to them. Moreover, 
in Hayek’s model of mind  - later corroborated by neurobiological research  - when an external 
stimulus is perceived on the basis of tacit and idiosyncratic elements, a neuronal connection takes 
place, which, from that moment on, will tend to reclassify similar stimuli always in the same way.   19 
Thus, the perceptive structure of that phenomenon and  - consequently  - the resulting action, are 
strengthened. Therefore, an economic agent’s behavior is dependent on the stochastic nature o f the 
perceptive phenomena of external data. They work as path-dependent self-strengthening 
mechanisms, every time an outcome proves satisficing. 
 
5.0. Concluding remarks  
 
The central idea in this paper is that neurobiological processes matter in decision making.  Starting 
from this statement, I have tried to describe the main characteristics of the neuronal processes and 
some of their implications for economic theory.  If the idea of bounded rationality has put in a 
critical position the neoclassical hypothesis of substantive rationality, giving birth to new models of 
behavior based on procedural rationality, the introduction of neurobiological arguments attempts to 
enrich these models. 
  What is asserted in this paper is that it is not enough to point out individual limits or the potential 
of human rationality, in order to infer an explanation of common behavior, on psychological bases 
and thus to maintain the full validity of the individual learning processes.  If neurobiological 
differences are taken i nto consideration, the picture becomes more complex.  In order to reach the 
results of approaches like Simon's, Akerlof's, Axelrod's, Nelson's and Winter's, and recent advances 
in game theory., where learning matters, one should not only assume that individuals are  charac-
terized by procedural rationality, but also by identical, or very similar, neuronal structures.  The 
reason is that, if there are different neuronal structures, as empirical evidence is showing, behavior 
cannot be predictable and turns o ut to be significantly different from the way it is described in 
procedural models. 
  In short, through the acquisition of the lesson that comes from contemporary psychology, we 
can state that knowledge is the result of an interaction between information and mental schemes, 
which in turn are the result of an endogenous elaboration.  And, assimilating the lesson derived 
from contemporary neurobiology, we can conversely assert that action is the result of the process of 
interaction between mind and brain.  If  it is important for economic theory to know the mechanisms 
that generate individual knowledge, it may even be more important to understand those which, 
based on the use of knowledge, generate action. 
  In practice, in the paper we put forward a possible integration between the subjectivistic 
approach and the procedural one, with the further integration of the hypothesis of somatic markers. 
  The most immediate consequences on economic theory seem to be relevant.    20 
As we tried to assert, the development of a neurobiological approach to decision making, consistent 
with the heterogeneous character of learning processes, confirms the failures of traditional 
rationality and the criticism of the optimizing approach. Moreover, it might yield important results 
in the analysis of repeated games and it might also contribute to extend path-dependent models. 
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